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Enhancing Creditor Recovery 
SHOULD SERVICES BE DEEMED “PROPERTY” FOR 
THE PURPOSE OF FRAUDULENT TRANSFER LAW? 
INTRODUCTION 
On the eve of his bankruptcy filing, Warren Ruffet, who 
has recently found himself in financial turmoil, gives his 
neighbor some valuable investment advice.  Several months 
later, the lucky neighbor quadruples her wealth, cashing in five 
million dollars from the sale of Warren’s stock pick.  
Meanwhile, on the other side of town, Tom Jones, an 
established plastic surgeon operates on a patient, who has been 
badly scarred in a car accident.  For personal reasons, Jones 
charges the patient only ten percent of what would have been a 
very expensive procedure.  The operation turns out to be a 
success.  Some months later, Jones, burdened by several 
ongoing malpractice lawsuits and rising insurance costs, files 
for bankruptcy.  
While factually different, the above scenarios have one 
thing in common:  both debtors provided services just before 
their bankruptcy filings.  Considering that Ruffet and Jones 
are now in bankruptcy, their creditors can no longer engage in 
individual collection efforts.  The filing of a bankruptcy petition 
operates as a temporary injunction against all collection 
activities.1  Because the bankruptcy laws prevent creditors 
from pursuing individual collection efforts, as a quid pro quo, a 
debtor cannot engage in creditor-harmful behavior by hiding 
his assets.2  Fraudulent transfer laws protect creditors from 
 1 In bankruptcy, this temporary injunction is called an automatic stay, 
because it stops all creditors from collection and enforcement activities against the 
debtor or his property.  The automatic stay, among other things, prevents creditors 
from attempting to collect any pre-bankruptcy claims or from enforcing any pre-
bankruptcy judgments.  11 U.S.C.S. § 362 (LexisNexis 1995, Cumulative Supp. Apr. 
2005 [hereinafter Supp. 2005] & Cumulative Later Case & Statutory Service Supp. 
Jan. 2006 [hereinafter Supp. 2006]).  Title 11 of the United States Code is commonly 
referred to as the Bankruptcy Code [hereinafter, the “Code” or the “Bankruptcy Code”]. 
 2 For example, without fraudulent transfer laws, a debtor could simply have 
a friend hold on to the debtor’s valuable personal property on the eve of bankruptcy so 
that the creditors do not get it.  Likewise, the debtor could transfer the title to his 
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such a manipulation of assets by reversing any property 
transfer made by a debtor on the eve of bankruptcy that 
diminishes or depletes the debtor’s estate.3   
In our hypotheticals, although Ruffet and Jones have 
made their creditors worse off by providing uncompensated 
services, their actions appear to be legitimate from a 
fraudulent transfer law perspective.4  This is so because 
generally, the prototypical debtor defrauds his creditors by 
transferring property, and not services, on the eve of 
bankruptcy.5  Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code explicitly 
prohibits such kind of transfers.6  The boundaries of fraudulent 
transfer law, however, become less clear when an insolvent 
debtor does not transfer any property but simply performs 
uncompensated services, as Ruffet and Jones did in the above 
examples.7   
Currently, under the Bankruptcy Code and existing 
case law, it is unclear whether Ruffet’s or Jones’ creditors can 
recover the fair market value of their services from their third 
party recipients.8  This lack of clarity stems from the fact that 
fraudulent transfer law deals only with transfers of property 
and not transfers of services.9  Indeed, section 548 of the 
Bankruptcy Code speaks of liability in the context of transfers 
  
house to his girlfriend with the understanding that she would transfer the title back 
once the bankruptcy case was over.  Both of these fraudulent transfers would deprive 
the debtor’s creditors of valuable assets that they could have collected but for the 
debtor’s bankruptcy filing.  Thus, in order to avoid such asset manipulation by the 
debtor at the expense of his creditors, the Bankruptcy Code provides for various 
mechanisms, including preference, id. § 547 (LexisNexis 1997, Supp. 2005 & Supp. 
2006), and fraudulent transfer provisions, id. § 548 (LexisNexis 1997, Supp. 2005 & 
Supp. 2006), which serve as a check on the debtor’s pre-bankruptcy behavior. 
 3 The fundamental remedy for a fraudulent transfer is to avoid, or set aside, 
that transfer.  Id. § 548(a).  In other words, the transfer is disregarded and creditors 
can recover the property itself or the value of the property from the third party.  Id. § 
550(a) (LexisNexis 1997).   
 4 If both of them had been paid for these services, their creditors would have 
been entitled to that money upon the debtors’ bankruptcy filings.  Eventually, the 
money would have been distributed equally on a pro rata basis to same-situated 
creditors.  Id. § 550.  Moreover, fraudulent transfer laws seek to prevent a debtor’s 
transfer of property to a third party that unfairly hampers the creditor’s ability to 
collect from the debtor.  Id. § 548.  In our two hypotheticals, neither Ruffet nor Jones 
transferred any property on the eve of bankruptcy.  Instead, they simply provided 
services.   
 5 Id. § 548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(I)-(IV). 
 6 Id. § 541(a) (LexisNexis 1997). 
 7 Typically, services are defined as “[a]n intangible commodity in the form of 
human effort, such as labor, skill, or advice.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1372 (7th ed. 
1999). 
 8 11 U.S.C.S. § 541(a). 
 9 See infra discussion and accompanying notes in Part I.C. 
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of property, not services.10  However, if bankruptcy courts were 
to classify services as property for the purposes of fraudulent 
transfer law, then creditors would have the power to collect the 
value of such services from third party recipients.  Thus, the 
determination of whether services should be deemed property 
tests the limits of fraudulent transfer law and weighs directly 
on one of the major bankruptcy policies—the maximization of 
debtors’ assets for the benefit of creditors.11   
This Note addresses the question of whether services 
provided by a debtor to a third party should be deemed a 
transfer of property for the purpose of valuing the debtor’s 
estate.12  As it now stands, services are not property under the 
traditional definition of the term.13  Nonetheless, ending the 
inquiry here seems premature.  In a bankruptcy context, courts 
can expand the concept of property to include services.  Yet, 
endorsing the blanket statement that services are always 
property seems equally unsound.  Considering the already-
prevalent pro-creditor sentiment of the Bankruptcy Code, such 
an approach would not only forestall the debtor’s recuperation 
efforts in bankruptcy, but also would interfere with the rights 
of third parties and cause them undue hardship despite their 
lack of privity with creditors.    
Part I of this Note provides an overview of fraudulent 
transfer theory under federal and state law.  Part II examines 
the question of whether services should be deemed “property” 
for the purposes of fraudulent transfer law.  It provides an 
overview of section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code, which 
specifically authorizes the trustee to challenge certain 
transfers deemed fraudulent.14  Also, it explains the concept of 
property as it is currently viewed under the fraudulent transfer 
scheme and draws parallels to cases dealing with marital 
division of assets on divorce.  The marital cases provide a good 
reference in this context because divorce proceedings usually 
require courts to determine the value of a spouse’s services for 
the purpose of dividing marital assets.  Part III describes the 
equitable approach used by marital courts and its application 
  
 10 See 1 GARRARD GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCE § 
212 (1940) [hereinafter GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES].   
 11 See infra discussion and accompanying notes in Part I.A. 
 12 The commencement of a bankruptcy case creates an “estate.”  The 
bankruptcy estate is comprised initially of all of the debtor’s interests in property at 
the time the case begins.  11 U.S.C.S. § 541. 
 13 See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text. 
 14 11 U.S.C.S. § 548.  
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in the fraudulent transfer context.  As an alternative, it then 
introduces the selective approach to services under the 
“underlying chattel” theory.15  The “underlying chattel” theory 
argues that services should not be deemed property unless they 
“culminate in transferable property.”16  In other words, if the 
performance of an uncompensated service confers a 
transferable asset on its recipient, then the bankruptcy courts 
should construe it as a transfer of property.17  In contrast, if an 
uncompensated service confers an intangible inalienable 
benefit, then the courts should not classify such services as a 
transfer of property.  Part III also advances arguments for and 
against considering services “property” in the fraudulent 
transfer context from the debtor, creditor and third party 
perspectives.   
I. OVERVIEW OF FRAUDULENT TRANSFER LAW 
The modern fraudulent transfer law originated from 
England’s Statute of 13 Elizabeth, passed in 1571.18  Later, the 
law continued to evolve in the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance 
Act (“UFCA”), the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, and most recently, 
the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“UFTA”).19  Although 
fraudulent transfer law has evolved, its application to modern 
transactions has remained difficult due to various evidentiary 
challenges.20  The law’s response to these challenges has 
  
 15 This approach comes from the Alabama Supreme Court’s opinion in 
American National Red Cross v. ASD Specialty Healthcare, 888 So. 2d 464, 466 (Ala. 
2003).  In addition, the notion of services “culminating in transferable property” has 
been articulated in the context of federal estate and gift taxation.  See, e.g., Comm’r v. 
Hogle, 165 F.2d 352 (10th Cir. 1947); BORIS I. BITTKER ET AL., FEDERAL ESTATE AND 
GIFT TAXATION 79-81 (8th ed. 2000). 
 16 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 17 For example, a debtor’s rendition of a service or advice to a third party may 
result in the creation of a tangible asset in the hands of that party such as cash, 
securities, works of art, and the like.  See, e.g., Comm’r v. Hogle, 165 F.2d 352 (10th 
Cir. 1947); FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION, supra note 15, at 79 and 
accompanying notes. 
 18 PETER A. ALCES, THE LAW OF FRAUDULENT TRANSACTIONS ¶ 5.01[2][a], at 
5-11 (1989)  “[T]he first fraudulent disposition statute in the English legal system; it 
provided the model for fraudulent conveyance law in the United States and continues 
to have an influence on fraudulent disposition jurisprudence.”  Id. ¶ 5.01[4][d][i], at 5-
21. 
 19 Id. ¶ 5.01[2][a], at 5-11. 
 20 See Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law 
and its Proper Domain, 38 VAND. L. REV. 829, 836 (1985).  “Hundreds of different 
mechanisms have evolved—from net worth and accounting requirements to security 
interests and default clauses—that guard against the risk of unacceptable debtor 
behavior.”  Id. (citing generally Robert Charles Clark, The Duties of the Corporate 
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produced a pro-creditor shift in the way courts and legislatures 
think about fraudulent transfer law.21
Part I explores these changes, first by providing 
background information on the bankruptcy process.  Then, it 
discusses the evolution and purpose of fraudulent transfer law 
and briefly looks at two main types of fraud:  actual and 
constructive.  Finally, it provides an overview of fraudulent 
transfer law in the context of the Bankruptcy Code22 as well as 
state law models—the UFTA and the UFCA.  
A.  Background and Purpose of Fraudulent Transfer Law 
From the beginning, the Statute of 13 Elizabeth 
condemned property transfers by the debtor who had an actual 
intent “to hinder, delay, or defraud” his creditors.23  
Subsequently, the drafters of the Bankruptcy Code expanded 
fraudulent transfer law to include constructively fraudulent 
transfers.24  This expansion allowed for automatic application 
of fraudulent transfer law whenever an insolvent debtor 
transferred property for inadequate consideration.25  Later, the 
legislature further broadened the scope of the law by making 
various amendments to the Bankruptcy Code.26  The most 
recent of these amendments went into effect on October 17, 
2005.27  The 2005 amendments exhibit a pro-creditor sentiment 
  
Debtor to Its Creditors, 90 HARV. L. REV. 505 (1977)).  For an extensive overview of 
these challenges posed by modern transactions, see Jack F. Williams, Revisiting the 
Proper Limits of Fraudulent Transfer Law, 8 BANKR. DEV. J. 55 (1991); Baird & 
Jackson, supra, at 830.  
 21 Williams, supra note 20, at 60, 66. 
 22 11 U.S.C.S. § 548 (LexisNexis 1997, Supp. 2005 & Supp. 2006).  
 23 ALCES, supra note 18, ¶ 5.01[4][d], at 5-21. 
 24 See id. ¶ 5.01[2][d], at 5-14. 
 25 Baird & Jackson, supra note 20, at 830. 
 26 See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 
(BAPCPA), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ust/eo/bapcpa/index.htm [hereinafter 
BAPCPA]. 
 27 SHEILA M. WILLIAMS ET AL., BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND 
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2005, at 3 (2005). 
Signed into law by President Bush on April 20, 2005, the Bankruptcy 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 represents the largest 
overhaul of the Bankruptcy Code since its enactment in 1978.  The Act seeks 
to “improve bankruptcy law and practice by restoring personal responsibility 
and integrity in the bankruptcy system and ensure that the system is fair for 
both debtors and creditors.” 
The heart of the Act’s consumer bankruptcy reforms consists of the 
implementation of a “means testing” mechanism that is intended to ensure 
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by focusing on protecting creditors from debtors’ abusive filing 
practices and discouraging debtors’ use of bankruptcy as a 
means of avoiding their obligations to creditors.28  For example, 
as of October 17, 2005, creditors can recover not only pre-
bankruptcy assets of a Chapter 11 individual debtor but also 
the assets that the individual debtor acquired after the 
bankruptcy filing.29  In contrast, before the 2005 amendments, 
the debtor’s property acquired post-petition was not a part of 
his bankruptcy estate and thus was not available for 
distribution to his creditors.30  Separately, the new 
amendments have also lengthened the time period for an 
individual debtor to obtain a bankruptcy discharge from six to 
eight years.31  In sum, the recent changes to the Bankruptcy 
Code have strengthened the creditors’ power in relation to the 
debtor’s bankruptcy options. 
With respect to a typical bankruptcy case, when a 
debtor files for bankruptcy several interesting things occur.  
First, commencement of the bankruptcy case creates a 
bankruptcy “estate” comprised of all of the debtor’s property at 
the time of the filing.32  The instant a debtor files a bankruptcy 
petition, the debtor’s property becomes the property of the 
estate, which means it no longer belongs to the debtor.33  
Property of the estate is an important concept in bankruptcy 
because it allows the bankruptcy trustee to liquidate the 
debtor’s nonexempt assets and to distribute those assets to 
  
that debtors repay creditors the maximum debtors can afford.  The Act also 
includes provisions intended to deter serial and abusive bankruptcy filings.  
Id.  See also Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer, The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention 
and Consumer Protection Act of 2005:  A Section-by-Section Analysis, in THE 
BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2005, at 1-3 
(2005). 
 28 WILLIAMS, supra note 27, at 54. 
 29 BAPCPA § 321(a)(1) (codified at 11 U.S.C.S. § 1115 (LexisNexis Supp. 
2006)).  Section 1115 of the Bankruptcy Code is a new Chapter 11 business 
reorganization section for cases filed by individual debtors.  See WILLIAMS, supra note 
27, at 107 (“The provision [§ 1115] also subjects a Chapter 11 discharge for an 
individual debtor to the same exceptions from discharge that apply to Chapter 7 and 
Chapter 13 cases.”). 
 30 WILLIAMS, supra note 27, at 107.   
 31 11 U.S.C.S. § 312(1); compare id. § 727(a)(8) (LexisNexis 2000), with id. 
§ 727(a)(8) (LexisNexis Supp. 2006). 
 32 Id. § 541(a) (LexisNexis 1997). 
 33 See id.  Some estate property may be later returned to the debtor as 
exempt property under section 522 (LexisNexis 2004 & Supp. 2005) or by abandonment 
under section 554 (LexisNexis 2004 & Supp. 2005). 
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creditors in an organized manner.34  Another important 
consequence of the bankruptcy filing is that it creates an 
“automatic stay” that stops all individual creditor collection 
efforts.35  The automatic stay functions as an injunction that 
temporarily protects the debtor from all creditor actions to 
collect pre-petition debts.36  The underlying goal of this process 
is to get an “honest but unfortunate debtor” back on his feet.37
The trustee’s role in the bankruptcy proceeding is 
manifold.  It includes protecting the property of the estate that 
has been collected for the benefit of creditors.38  In addition, 
aside from determining whether any property should be 
removed from the estate and returned to the debtor as exempt 
property, a trustee may avoid certain property transfers made 
by the debtor in order to maximize the value of the estate 
available for distribution to creditors.39  Sections 544 through 
551 of the Code provide the bankruptcy trustee with such 
“avoiding powers,”40 including the power to set aside fraudulent 
transfers.41   
To understand the purposes of fraudulent transfer law, 
one must look at the underlying policies of bankruptcy.  As a 
collective proceeding, bankruptcy enhances creditor recovery 
using a presumption of equality among same-situated creditors 
  
 34 The trustee is a representative of the bankruptcy estate, id. § 323(a) 
(LexisNexis 2004 & Supp. 2005).  See BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL ¶ 6.08, at 6-48 
(Benjamin Weintraub and Alan N. Resnick eds., Warren, Forham & Lamont 1992).  
There are several different types of trustees depending on which bankruptcy chapter 
the case is filed under.  See id. ¶ 6.08, at 6-49.     
 35 11 U.S.C.S. § 362 (LexisNexis 1995, Supp. 2005 & Supp. 2006). 
 36 BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL, supra note 34, ¶ 1.09[1], at 1-35. 
 37 Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934). 
 38 BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL, supra note 34, ¶ 6.08, at 6-48. 
 39 Id. ¶ 7, at 7-3. 
 40 11 U.S.C.S. §§ 544-51 (LexisNexis 1997, Supp. 2005 & Supp. 2006). 
Avoiding powers are powers given to a trustee in bankruptcy to recover property 
interests for the benefit of all of the debtor’s creditors.  BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL, 
supra note 34, ¶ 7, at 7-3.  After the trustee has avoided a property interest, 11 U.S.C.S 
§ 550, the transfer that created that property interest is “preserved for the benefit of 
the estate,” id. § 551, and any interest in property so recovered becomes the property of 
the estate, id. § 541(a)(3). 
 41 11 U.S.C.S. § 548.  While this Note focuses on section 548, the analysis 
similarly would apply to section 547, which allows the trustee to avoid preferential 
transfers made shortly before the commencement of the bankruptcy case that 
otherwise would allow one creditor to claim more than its fair share of the debtor’s 
assets.  Id. § 547.  Section 547 is intended to assure equality of distribution among 
same-situated creditors.  BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL, supra note 34, ¶ 7.05, at 7-18.  
See also Thomas H. Jackson, Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REV. 725, 
757 (1984) (“[P]references differ from fraudulent conveyances precisely because 
preference law focuses on relationships among creditors in light of the advantages of a 
collective proceeding, not on relationships between creditors and their debtor.”). 
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as a starting point.42  From a creditor’s standpoint, the 
underlying goals of bankruptcy are to deal with the universe of 
creditors as a whole on an equitable basis and to maximize the 
value of the estate available for distribution to all creditors.43  
In contrast to bankruptcy, state collection law focuses on the 
rights of an individual creditor whose motivation is to get to 
the debtor’s assets before any other creditor. 44
In bankruptcy, fraudulent transfer laws allow creditors 
to set aside certain transfers by debtors that undermine 
creditors’ collection efforts and unfairly diminish the debtor’s 
estate.45  A debtor facing imminent economic downfall is more 
likely to conceal property in an effort to defraud his creditors.  
The law of fraudulent transfers seeks to prevent precisely these 
types of actions.46   
B.  Actual and Constructive Fraud 
There are two major types of fraudulent transfers: 
actual and constructive.47  Classic fraudulent transfer law only 
dealt with the debtor who intentionally manipulated his assets 
in order to keep them away from his creditors.48  Today, actual 
fraud remains the basis for avoidance of transfers under 
section 548(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code and requires proof of 
the subjective intention of the debtor in making a transfer.49  
For example, a debtor who gives his valuable personal property 
to a friend on the eve of bankruptcy, so that the creditors do 
not get it, has made an actual transfer with the “intent to 
hinder, delay, or defraud [his creditors].”50  Constructive fraud, 
on the other hand, manifests itself through the presence of 
certain specified facts irrespective of the actual subjective 
  
 42 BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL, supra note 34, ¶ 7.05, at 7-18.   
 43 Jackson, supra note 41, at 728-29. 
 44 BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL, supra note 34, ¶ 2.02, at 2-4 (“In addition, our 
system of debt collection is based on “grab law” pursuant to which the first creditors to 
acquire liens on the debtor’s property succeed to the detriment of the remaining 
creditors who are left empty-handed.”).  
 45 GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES, supra note 10, § 275. 
 46 ALCES, supra note 18, ¶ 5.01[1]. 
 47 11 U.S.C.S. § 548; see infra notes 48, 51 and accompanying text. 
 48 Jackson, supra note 41, at 778 (citing Clark, supra note 20).  
 49 BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL, supra note 34, ¶ 7.06[1], at 7-58 (“The state of 
mind of the debtor must be examined in order to determine whether this type of fraud 
[referring to actual fraud] took place.”). 
 50 11 U.S.C.S. § 548(a)(1)(A). 
2006] SERVICES IN FRAUDULENT TRANSFER LAW 325 
intention of the debtor.51  As a result, constructive fraud serves 
as “a per se rule” of avoidance in cases of alleged fraud where 
there is little to no apparent evidence of actual wrongdoing.52  
Even if there is no evidence of a debtor’s misbehavior, some 
transfers by their very nature make creditors worse off and are 
thus facially suspect.53  Under this rationale, constructive fraud 
becomes a creditor’s remedy against the debtor.54
C.  Current Fraudulent Transfer Laws 
Today, fraudulent transfer laws are incorporated in the 
Bankruptcy Code and the law of every state.55  These laws are 
not identical but they overlap in many respects.  Section 548 of 
the Bankruptcy Code governs avoidance of fraudulent 
transfers.56  State fraudulent law can be invoked under section 
544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.57  In addition, individual states 
follow the UFTA or the UFCA.58  Several states, however, have 
not adopted uniform or even statutory fraud laws and instead 
deal with fraudulent transfer law as a matter of case law.59   
  
 51 Id. § 548(a)(1)(B); see also GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES, supra note 
10, § 275, at 471; § 294, at 510-11; & § 298, at 518. 
 52 Baird & Jackson, supra note 20, at 831; see, e.g., Philco Fin. Corp. v. 
Pearson, 335 F. Supp. 33, 40-41 (N.D. Miss. 1971): 
Courts often infer a fraudulent intention from circumstances attending a 
transaction from the presence of certain well-known labels or badges of fraud. 
These badges of fraud are suspicious circumstances which, if unexplained, 
warrant an inference of fraud, and the more common badges of fraud were 
thus enumerated in Reed v. Lavecchia, 187 Miss. 413, 193 So. 439 (1940): 
“Inadequacy of consideration, transaction not in usual course or 
mode of doing business, absolute conveyance as security, secrecy, 
insolvency of grantor, transfer of all his property, attempt to give 
evidence of fairness by conscripting sister-in-law as a conduit for 
passing title to the wife, retention of possession, failure to take a 
list of the property covered by the conveyance which was 
commingled with some furniture and fixtures belonging to his 
father’s estate, relationship of the parties, and transfer to person 
having no apparent use for the property.” 
Philco Fin. Corp., 335 F. Supp. at 40-41 (quoting Lavecchia, 187 Miss. at 424-25). 
 53 Baird & Jackson, supra note 20, at 831-32. 
 54 See id. at 831.  
 55 WM. MILLER COLLIER ET AL., COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 548.01[4], at 548-
12 (Alan N. Resnick and Henry J. Sommer, eds., 15th ed. 2006). 
 56 11 U.S.C.S. § 548.   
 57 Id. § 544(b)(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2005).   
 58 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 55, ¶ 548.01[3], at 548-611. 
 59 See ALCES, supra note 18, ¶ 1.02[1][b][i] (“Those states are in the minority, 
and, in fact, will occasionally refer to the UFCA and cases decided thereunder to 
resolve fraudulent disposition issues.”).  
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The UFTA is in many respects similar to section 548 of 
the Code.60  While the legislature originally wanted to replace 
the UFCA with the UFTA, some states, such as New York, still 
use the UFCA. 61  For the most part, the drafters of the UFTA 
tried to provide guidance for potential fraudulent transfer 
problems in complex transactions.62  The UFTA maintained the 
original definition of an actual fraudulent transfer.63  However, 
in deciding whether a transferor received value, the UFTA, 
unlike the UFCA, let go of the “good faith requirement.”64  
Furthermore, in an effort to make it more difficult to defraud 
creditors, the UFTA allowed creditors extra relief against 
recipients of fraudulent transfers.65  
With respect to the Bankruptcy Code, section 548 is one 
of the most powerful tools available to a bankruptcy trustee 
who believes that the debtor made a fraudulent transfer; the 
trustee may also utilize applicable state law under the “‘strong-
arm’ power”66 of section 544.67  Section 548 is a mechanism to 
police “fraud and self-dealing by a debtor at the expense of the 
debtor’s creditors.”68  Section 548(a) authorizes the trustee to 
challenge fraudulent transfers made within two years before 
the filing of the bankruptcy case.69  In part, it provides: 
(a) (1) The trustee may avoid any transfer . . . of an interest of the 
debtor in property, or any obligation . . . incurred by the debtor, that 
was made or incurred on or within 2 years before the date of the 
filing of the petition, if the debtor voluntarily or involuntarily— 
(A) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with 
actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any entity to 
which the debtor was or became, on or after the date that 
such transfer was made or such obligation was incurred, 
indebted; or 
(B) (i) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in 
exchange for such transfer or obligation; and 
  
 60 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 55, ¶ 548.01[3], at 548-611. 
 61 N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW §§ 270-81 (McKinney 1990).  
 62 ALCES, supra note 18, ¶ 1.02 [1][b][iii]. 
 63 Id. 
 64 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 55, ¶ 548.01[3], at 548-611.  
 65 Id. 
 66 Jackson, supra note 41, at 732. 
 67 “The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property 
or any obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable under applicable law by a 
creditor holding an unsecured claim . . . .”  11 U.S.C.S. § 544(b)(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 
2005). 
 68 In re Feiler, 218 F.3d 948, 955 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 69 11 U.S.C.S. § 548(a)(1) (LexisNexis 1997, Supp. 2005 & Supp. 2006).  
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(ii)(I) was insolvent on the date that such transfer 
was made or such obligation was incurred, or 
became insolvent as a result of such transfer or 
obligation. . . .70
On its face, the Bankruptcy Code restricts fraudulent 
transfer law to a transfer of an interest in property.71  Thus, a 
creditor seeking to avoid any type of fraudulent transfer, actual 
or constructive, must show that a debtor made a transfer of 
property and not merely a transfer of services.72  Black’s Law 
Dictionary defines property as “the right of ownership”73 and 
defines services as “[a]n intangible commodity in the form of 
human effort, such as labor, skill, or advice.”74  Accordingly, 
when a reasonable person thinks about property, he or she 
considers “whether it can be assigned, sold, transferred, 
conveyed, or pledged, or whether it terminates on the death of 
the owner.”75  If services are something “personal to the 
holder,”76 which terminate at death and are not inheritable, 
then those services have no proprietal attributes in the 
traditional sense of the term.77  Unlike Black’s Law Dictionary, 
the Bankruptcy Code does not define the term property or 
services.78  As a result, this lack of definition leaves ample room 
for further expansion of fraudulent transfer law.  In fact, it 
allows courts to maneuver on a case-by-case basis to determine 
whether services should be deemed property in the fraudulent 
transfer context.    
II.  SHOULD SERVICES BE DEEMED PROPERTY? 
Under the current Bankruptcy Code and existing case 
law, it is unclear whether a debtor’s creditors can recover the 
  
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 7, at 1232. 
 74 Id. at 1372. 
 75 In re Marriage of Graham, 574 P.2d 75, 77 (Colo. 1978) (citing In re 
Marriage of Ellis (Colo. Ct. App. 1975), 538 P.2d 1347, aff’d sub nom., Ellis v. Ellis, 552 
P.2d 506 (Colo. 1976)).   
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. (deciding that an M.B.A. was not “property” for purposes of dissolution 
of a marriage). 
 78 The UFTA defines “property” as “anything that may be the subject of 
ownership.”  UFTA § 1(10) (1984).  The comment to the UFTA further explains that 
“property includes both real and personal property, whether tangible or intangible, and 
any interest in property, whether legal or equitable.”  Id. § 1, cmt. (10). 
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fair market value of the debtor’s services provided to a third 
party.  If courts were to classify services as property for the 
purpose of fraudulent transfer law, then creditors could recover 
the fair market value of such services from third party 
recipients.  However, if courts were to leave property and 
services to their traditional definitions, then the value of such 
services would be out of creditors’ reach.  Part II addresses 
central considerations that must be taken into account when 
deciding whether services should be deemed property.  First, it 
discusses the intricacies of fraudulent transfer law under 
section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code.  Then, it describes how the 
concept of property has been applied in a bankruptcy setting.  
Finally, it examines the concept of property in other contexts 
and considers the implications of reclassifying services as 
property in the context of fraudulent transfer law.        
A.  Fraudulent Transfers: An Overview of Section 548  
The bankruptcy law balances debtor and creditor rights 
with the goal of accomplishing an equitable allocation of 
assets.79  Under section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code, a 
bankruptcy trustee may recover property for the bankruptcy 
estate if (1) there was a transfer, (2) of a debtor’s interest in 
property, (3) made on or within two years before the debtor’s 
bankruptcy petition.80  One of the essential elements for setting 
a transfer aside under section 548(a)(1)(A) is the debtor’s 
subjective fraudulent intent which can be established by 
circumstantial acts.81  On the other hand, section 548(a)(1)(B) 
deals with constructively fraudulent transfers, thereby 
asserting that a transfer is not constructively fraudulent if the 
debtor received adequate consideration.82   
  
 79 ALCES, supra note 18, ¶ 1.03[2]. 
 80 11 U.S.C.S. § 548(a), (b) (LexisNexis 1997, Supp. 2005 & Supp. 2006). 
 81 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 55, ¶ 548.04[1], at 548-22.3; see also 
11 U.S.C.S. § 548(a)(1)(A). 
 82 11 U.S.C.S. § 548(a)(1)(B).  Unlike the UFCA, the Code’s adequate 
consideration requirement does not contain a good faith component.  COLLIER ON 
BANKRUPTCY, supra note 55, ¶ 548.05[1][b].  However, “[a]lthough good faith is not an 
element of the [Bankruptcy Code’s] section 548(d)(2) definition of ‘value’, the bad faith 
of a transferee may still result in the setting aside of a transfer if the transferee’s bad 
faith can be imputed to the transferor so that the transferor actually intended ‘to 
hinder, delay, or defraud’ creditors.”  Id.  For the purposes of section 548, “‘value’ 
means property, or satisfaction or securing of a present or antecedent debt of the 
debtor, but does not include an unperformed promise to furnish support to the debtor 
or to a relative of the debtor.”  11 U.S.C.S. § 548(d)(2)(A). 
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Thus, to determine whether a fraudulent transfer has 
occurred, courts must address several issues.  First, a 
bankruptcy trustee who is seeking to avoid any type of 
fraudulent transfer must prove that a “transfer” has occurred.  
The Bankruptcy Code defines “transfer” in section 101(54) as 
“each mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, 
voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with (i) 
property, or (ii) an interest in property.”83  The court must also 
determine the time of the transfer since a fraudulent transfer 
may only be set aside if it “was made or incurred on or within 2 
years before the date of the filing of the petition.”84  Once a 
party seeking to invalidate the transfer proves that a “transfer” 
was made, it also has to show that the transfer involved the 
debtor’s “property.”85  However, unlike the term “transfer,” 
bankruptcy law does not provide for an exhaustive or uniform 
understanding of the term “property.”86  In searching for the 
meaning of this term, courts often refer to “commercial sense 
and pertinent state law property concepts.”87   
B.  The Concept of Property in Bankruptcy 
The Statute of Elizabeth limited the concept of property 
to tangible assets.88  Today, however, creditors can recover 
tangible or intangible property.89  In order to maximize 
creditors’ remedies, the courts have breathed elasticity into the 
term “property.”90  Generally, it includes “anything of value, 
anything which has debt paying or debt securing power.”91  In 
Segal v. Rochelle, the Supreme Court explained that the 
purpose of construing the term “property” broadly is  
to secure for creditors everything of value the [debtor] may possess 
in alienable or leviable form when he files his petition.  To this end, 
the term ‘property’ has been construed most generously and an 
  
 83 11 U.S.C.S. § 101(54). 
 84  Id. § 548(a)(1).  But see the new § 548(e)(1), which provides a trustee with 
a ten year limitation period to avoid a debtor’s transfer made “to a self-settled trust or 
similar device.”  Id. 
 85 Id. 
 86 See discussion infra Part II.B. and accompanying notes. 
 87 ALCES, supra note 18, ¶ 6.02[1][b].   
 88 GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES, supra note 10, § 135. 
 89 Id. § 138. 
 90 Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 379 (1966); In re Lewis W. Shurtleff, Inc., 
778 F.2d 1416, 1419 (9th Cir. 1985).   
 91 Pirie v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 182 U.S. 438, 443 (1901).   
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interest is not outside creditors’ reach just because it is novel or 
contingent or because enjoyment must be postponed.92   
While the Bankruptcy Code does not contain a 
definition of property, it also does not explicitly exclude 
services from being classified as property.  Although this 
decision is ultimately left to judicial analysis and 
interpretation, the lack of any definition leaves courts to many 
interpretive possibilities.  The very fact that the traditional 
concepts of property and services are dissimilar at first glance 
may allow courts to recognize overarching interpretations 
when analyzing these concepts.  Currently, however, there is 
little case law dealing with the question of whether services 
could be considered property in the fraudulent transfer context.  
Accordingly, marital law cases offer some relevant examples.       
C.  Property in Other Contexts: Learning From Marital Law 
Cases 
In marital cases, courts have often crossed the bridge 
from the traditional definition of property to a more liberal 
construction of an asset in question in order to achieve an 
equitable result.93  For example, courts have viewed a medical 
degree or a celebrity’s career as property eligible for equitable 
distribution.94  In the decisions that follow, the judicial 
perception of marital property invariably stems from the view 
that the institution of marriage is “an economic partnership.”95  
As such, it involves a specific exchange of tangible and 
intangible resources, which must be accounted for upon 
divorce.96  In adopting an equitable approach to such an 
analysis, the courts ultimately move away from formal or 
traditional definitions of property in order to include such 
  
 92 Segal, 382 U.S. at 379.  
 93 Archer v. Archer, 493 A.2d 1074, 1077-78 (Md. 1985). 
 94 See discussion infra notes 97-130 and accompanying text.  Marital property 
is defined broadly as “all property acquired by either or both spouses during the 
marriage and before the execution of a separation agreement or the commencement of 
a matrimonial action, regardless of the form in which title is held.”  O’Brien v. O’Brien, 
489 N.E.2d 712, 715 (N.Y. 1985). 
 95 Forcucci v. Forcucci, 443 N.Y.S.2d 1013, 1015 (App. Div. 1981) (“The 
Equitable Distribution Law was enacted as the result of a growing realization that the 
marriage relationship is also an economic partnership and that when a marriage ends 
there should be some comprehensive and fair approach to the economic incidents of 
divorce.”). 
 96 Id. 
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intangible assets like professional degrees and careers under 
the property umbrella.   
To begin, in O’Brien v. O’Brien,97 the New York Court of 
Appeals held that a husband’s medical degree obtained during 
his marriage could be marital property subject to equitable 
distribution upon divorce.98  In that case, the parties were 
married for almost ten years.99  During that period, the couple’s 
efforts were primarily focused on obtaining the husband’s 
medical degree.100  In fact, while the husband was in the 
process of obtaining his medical degree, the wife worked to 
support both of them instead of pursuing her permanent 
teaching certification.101  After completing his undergraduate 
degree and premedical requirements, the O’Briens relocated to 
Guadalajara, Mexico, where Mr. O’Brien attended medical 
school.102  During this time, Mrs. O’Brien continued to work to 
support them financially.103  The parties later returned to New 
York so that Mr. O’Brien could complete his degree program 
and internship. 104  Two months after Mr. O’Brien received his 
license to practice medicine, he filed for divorce.105   
At the divorce proceeding, Mr. O’Brien argued that his 
medical degree was not property but rather a “personal 
attainment in acquiring knowledge.”106  The Court of Appeals 
disagreed explaining that traditional common law property 
doctrine does not constrain the definition of marital property.107  
Indeed, the court reasoned that although a degree does not 
render itself to “sale, assignment or transfer,” it still might be 
“property” under the New York divorce statute.108  In the 
court’s opinion, the New York statutory law with respect to 
marital property easily accommodated inclusion of a medical 
degree.109  Further, the court noted that the statute’s economic 
partnership theory required classification of career assets as 
  
 97 489 N.E.2d 712 (N.Y. 1985). 
 98 Id. at 713.   
 99 See id. at 713-14. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id.  
 102 Id. at 714. 
 103 O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d at 714.   
 104 Id. 
 105 Id.  
 106 Id. at 715. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. at 717 (“That a professional license has no market value is irrelevant.”). 
 109 O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d at 715. 
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marital property subject to equitable distribution.110  In sum, 
the O’Brien court, through the use of equity and with the goal 
of doing justice for the suffering spouse, went beyond the 
traditional definition of property in order to enlarge the marital 
estate. 
Hence, in Golub v. Golub,111 a New York trial court held 
that a spouse’s celebrity career, similar to a professional 
degree, represents marital property upon divorce.112  In Golub, 
a famous actress and model, Marisa Berenson, married an 
established attorney.113  After four and a half years of marriage, 
the couple divorced.114  Throughout the marriage, Ms. Berenson 
was focused on advancing her career.115  She spent a lot of time 
abroad, during which time Mr. Golub took care of their home.116  
At the divorce proceeding, Mr. Golub argued that the increase 
in value of his spouse’s acting and modeling career was marital 
property, subject to  equitable distribution upon divorce.117  The 
court sided with Mr. Golub, rejecting Ms. Berenson’s 
arguments “that her celebrity status is neither ‘professional’ 
nor a ‘license’ and hence not an ‘investment in human capital 
subject to equitable distribution.’”118  In deciding the issue, the 
court referred to O’Brien v. O’Brien, in which the Court of 
Appeals held that a professional license constituted marital 
property.119  The Golub court concluded that “[t]he O’Brien 
remedy should be applied evenhandedly to all spouses,” 
professional and nonprofessional alike,120 justifying its decision 
by the need to avoid “an economic windfall to some and an 
  
 110 Id. at 716.  The court stated: 
The Legislature has decided, by its explicit reference in the statute to the 
contributions of one spouse to the other’s profession or career, that these 
contributions represent investment in the economic partnership of the 
marriage and that the product of the parties’ joint efforts, the professional 
license, should be considered marital property.   
Id. 
 111 527 N.Y.S.2d 946 (Sup. Ct. 1988). 
 112 Id. at 950. 
 113 Id. at 947. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. at 948. 
 116 Id.  
 117 Golub, 527 N.Y.S.2d at 949. 
 118 Id. at 949. 
 119 489 N.E.2d 712 (N.Y. 1985).  See supra notes 97-110 and accompanying 
text.  
 120 Golub, 527 N.Y.S.2d at 950. 
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unfair deprivation to others.”121  The court noted that marital 
property should not be constrained to “licenses enumerated in 
the Education Law.”122  It further held that “the skills of an 
artisan, actor, professional athlete or any person whose 
expertise in his or her career has enabled him or her to become 
an exceptional wage earner should be valued as marital 
property subject to equitable distribution.”123     
In another case, Elkus v. Elkus, a famous opera singer, 
Frederica von Stade, filed for divorce after a seventeen-year 
marriage.124  During the course of the marriage, Ms. von Stade 
reached the apex of her career.125  Her husband alleged that he 
contributed to his wife’s success, and therefore, her career 
should be shared as marital property.126  The appellate court 
agreed with Mr. Elkus, holding that under the New York 
definition, “things of value acquired during marriage are 
marital property even though they may fall outside the scope of 
traditional property concepts.”127  The court further stated that 
“[t]he statutory definition of marital property does not mandate 
that it be an asset with an exchange value or be salable, 
assignable or transferable.”128  Thus, the court found no reason 
why it could not extend the O’Brien rule to a celebrity career.  
The Elkus court followed Golub’s reasoning, noting that 
“[t]here is no rational basis upon which to distinguish between 
a degree, a license, or any other special skill that generates a 
substantial income.”129  Therefore, because defendant 
contributed to the advancement of Ms. von Stade’s career, such 
advancement constituted marital property.130
In the marital context, because courts recognize that the 
supporting spouse suffers inequity and unfairness upon 
divorce, the courts choose to even the score between the 
spouses by declaring intangible assets such as professional 
degrees and celebrity careers to be marital property.131  This 
  
 121 Id.  
 122 Id. at 949. 
 123 Id. at 950. 
 124 572 N.Y.S.2d 901 (Sup. Ct. 1991). 
 125 Id. at 902. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. (citing O’Brien v. O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712 (N.Y. 1985)). 
 128 Id. at 902. 
 129 Id. at 904. 
 130 Elkus, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 904. 
 131 See, e.g., O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d at 716-17 (noting that it is “unfair not to 
consider the license a marital asset” in light of the fact that “[w]orking spouses are 
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inequity is especially acute where the supporting spouse 
purposely puts the development of his or her own career on 
hold.  By analogy, a creditor, like a supporting spouse, also 
suffers inequity and unfairness when a debtor breaks his 
contractual obligations and leaves his creditor empty-handed.  
In the fraudulent transfer context, this inequity manifests 
itself where the debtor purposely transfers assets on the eve of 
bankruptcy so that his creditors get nothing.  Thus, the 
equitable analysis employed by the marital courts may also be 
applied to the concept of services in the bankruptcy context.  
Specifically, instead of being bound by the traditional concepts 
of property, bankruptcy courts can choose to construe the term 
“property” in such a way as to include services under its 
umbrella.  This approach would maximize the value of the 
debtor’s estate, thus providing a powerful remedy to the 
debtor’s creditors.  Otherwise, if services cannot be considered 
property, it might allow disinterested debtors to manipulate 
the bankruptcy process in order to deprive creditors of a 
valuable asset. 
As the above examples demonstrate, from time to time, 
courts do assign property-like characteristics to services.132  
And if disputes are to be resolved with respect to services, 
reference to property law second to contract law133 would 
probably be most helpful.  However, not every fraudulent 
transfer case involving services should be subject to 
propertization.  Instead, bankruptcy courts should selectively 
recognize only certain attributes of services as property.  
Through this selective approach, courts can achieve the 
underlying bankruptcy goals without infringing on the debtor’s 
rights or the rights of third parties. 
III.  A SELECTIVE APPROACH TO THE UNION OF SERVICES AND 
PROPERTY 
Services should not be deemed property in the 
fraudulent transfer context unless such services “culminate in 
  
often required to contribute substantial income as wage earners, sacrifice their own 
educational or career goals and opportunities for child rearing, perform the bulk of 
household duties and responsibilities and forego the acquisition of marital assets that 
could have been accumulated if the professional spouse had been employed rather than 
occupied with the study and training necessary to acquire a professional license”).  
 132 See supra Part II.C. 
 133 Baird & Jackson, supra note 20, at 835-36. 
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transferable property.”134  Accordingly, the equitable approach 
to defining property used by marital courts, as illustrated in 
Part II.C., may not be appropriate in all fraudulent transfer 
situations.  Considering that there is no real check on 
overexpansion of what is to be considered property due to lack 
of precise definitions, any attempt to liberally apply fraudulent 
transfer law to services can create a dangerous precedent.  For 
example, application of the equitable approach would be 
inappropriate in our Jones hypothetical because the “asset” at 
issue, i.e., the health benefit to the patient, is unquantifiable.  
Therefore, courts should be selective in classifying services as 
property in the fraudulent transfer context. 
Part III discusses specific fraudulent transfer situations 
where the equitable approach may be appropriate for resolving 
fraudulent transfers.  In addition, it explains the “underlying 
chattel” theory through case law and contrasts it with the 
equitable approach.  Finally, it concludes that all services 
cannot be simply classified as property and argues for an 
application of a selective approach to services in the fraudulent 
transfer context. 
A.  The Union of Services and Property 
Expanding the formal definition of property to services 
under the equitable approach may be justified in transfers 
made with actual fraudulent intent, as opposed to constructive 
intent.  Indeed, where a debtor is intentionally trying to delay 
or hinder his creditors’ ability to collect on the owed debt, the 
chances are that the debtor and the third party are not entirely 
blameless.  For example, Picasso may agree to paint the 
neighbor’s picture on the eve of bankruptcy with the 
understanding that the neighbor will pay Picasso for the 
portrait once Picasso is out of bankruptcy.  In such a case, the 
court should be able to view Picasso’s services as property 
regardless of whether a contractual agreement can be proven, 
and recover the painting from the neighbor for the benefit of 
creditors.135  However, in a constructively fraudulent scenario, 
  
 134 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 135 Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code includes in the property of the estate 
“all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the 
case.”  11 U.S.C.S. § 541(a)(1) (LexisNexis 1997).  Thus, if it can be established that 
Picasso and the neighbor entered into a contract before Picasso’s filing of bankruptcy, 
the neighbor’s subsequent payment would become property of the estate based on the 
contractual obligation.   
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where a debtor provides uncompensated services without any 
intent to defraud his creditors, the use of the equitable 
approach is too overreaching and may allow creditors to get a 
windfall at the expense of an innocent third party.   
Therefore, as an alternative to the equitable approach, 
bankruptcy courts should include services under the property 
umbrella only if the services “culminate in transferable 
property.”136  Instructive on this point is American National 
Red Cross v. ASD Specialty Healthcare,137 in which the 
Supreme Court of Alabama looked to the underlying nature of 
the service—as chattel—to conclude that it constituted 
property for the purpose of fraudulent transfer law.138  In that 
case, the court held that blood products qualify as “property” 
under the Alabama Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act 
(AUFTA), even though the Alabama’s Uniform Commercial 
Code specifically termed “the act of procuring and furnishing 
the blood products” to be a service.139  In ASD Specialty 
Healthcare, the plaintiff’s cause of action arose from a contract 
it had with the defendants.140  This contract concerned sale of 
blood products.141  As one of its allegations, the plaintiff 
contended that one of the defendants engaged in conduct which 
violated AUFTA.  Specifically, the conduct involved transfer of 
blood products.142  In rebuttal, the defendants argued that the 
statute was not applicable since “the blood products in question 
are considered, for all purposes, to be a ‘service’ under the 
[Alabama’s Commercial Code] and, therefore, not ‘property’ 
under the AUFTA.”143  Indeed, Alabama’s Uniform Commercial 
Code provided in part that: 
Procuring, furnishing, donating, processing, distributing, or using 
human whole blood, plasma, blood products, blood derivatives, and 
other human tissues such as corneas, bones or organs for the 
purpose of injecting, transfusing, or transplanting any of them in the 
  
 136 “The purpose of the [Alabama Uniform Transfer Act] is to prohibit 
fraudulent transfers of property by a debtor who intends to defraud creditors by 
placing assets beyond their reach.”  Thompson Props. v. Birmingham Hide & Tallow 
Co., 839 So. 2d 629, 632 (Ala. 2002). 
 137 888 So. 2d 464 (Ala. 2004). 
 138 Id. at 466.  
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. at 465. 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. “A default judgment has previously been entered against LA 
Pharamceutical and Peter Woolley, neither of which are defendants in this current 
action.”  Id. 
 143 ASD Specialty Healthcare, 888 So. 2d at 465.   
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human body is declared for all purposes to be the rendition of a 
service by every person participating therein and whether any 
remuneration is paid therefore is declared not to be a sale of such 
whole blood, plasma, blood products, blood derivatives, or other 
human tissues.144   
Referencing the statute, the Alabama Supreme Court 
agreed with the plaintiff that blood products were property for 
purposes of AUFTA, explaining that “the act of procuring and 
furnishing the blood products—not the blood products 
themselves”—constituted a service in this instance.145  The 
court distinguished between “the act of procuring and 
furnishing blood products” and the underlying blood products 
themselves, thereby concluding that since blood products can 
be owned, they are property for purposes of AUFTA.146
Although the state statute in ASD Specialty Healthcare 
defined furnishing of blood as a service, the court looked to the 
“underlying chattel” nature of this service in order to conclude 
that the transfer was, after all, the transfer of property and 
thus subject to fraudulent transfer law.147  Just like the ASD 
Specialty Healthcare case, our earlier hypotheticals illustrate 
the “underlying chattel” approach.  Recall that Warren Ruffet’s 
neighbor quadrupled her wealth as a result of Ruffet’s free 
investment advice.  Hence, Ruffet’s uncompensated services 
should justifiably become property of his bankruptcy estate 
available for distribution to creditors; since the service itself 
cannot be recovered from a practical standpoint, a creditor can 
recover the underlying property of that service or the money 
from the sale of stock.  Similarly, and even more to the point, 
Picasso, who paints a portrait for his neighbor for free, has 
given his neighbor a wealth-producing piece of property, while 
depriving his own creditors of a valuable asset.  Although the 
act of painting constituted a service, the painting itself is 
  
 144 ALA. CODE § 7-2-314(4) (LexisNexis 2002). 
 145 ASD Specialty Healthcare, 888 So. 2d at 466. 
 146 Id. at 466.  However, the dissenting Justices noted that the transaction at 
issue should not be considered “property” under AUFTA for several reasons.  First, 
Justice Lyons refused to focus exclusively on the nature of the blood products apart 
from the acts of procuring or furnishing blood products in light of the “all purposes” 
language of the statute.  Id. at 467 (Lyons, J., dissenting).  Second, Justice Houston 
distinguished between the actual rendition of a service, which cannot be the subject of 
ownership and service contracts, which like property, can be owned.  Id. at 470 
(Houston, J., dissenting from denial of application for rehearing).  Third, Justice 
Houston also argued that once Woolley had distributed the blood products to the 
defendants, the service was complete and could not be transferred or be the subject of 
ownership.  Id. 
 147 Id. at 466 (majority opinion). 
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property.  Thus, even if the neighbor subsequently sold the 
painting to someone else, creditors should be able to recover 
the full value of the painting from the neighbor.   
In both of these instances, the “underlying chattel” 
theory would force the neighbors to disgorge to the bankruptcy 
trustee the fair market value of services that they have 
received.  This conclusion springs from the well-established 
rationale behind constructively fraudulent transfers for 
inadequate consideration:  that the debtor has a moral duty to 
give priority to his legal obligations, i.e., his creditors, before 
attending to his own or anyone else’s interests.148  In short, a 
fraudulent transfer is a “wrong” against creditors.149  
In contrast to the Ruffet and Picasso hypotheticals, 
however, it is difficult to imagine how Tom Jones’ services 
could be deemed property for the purposes of fraudulent 
transfer law.  This is because Jones’ services lack the 
“underlying chattel” quality in the sense that they did not 
result in transferable property.  Indeed, Jones simply restored 
his patient’s physical appearance and well-being.  Hence, while 
Ruffet’s business acumen and Picasso’s skill “culminated in 
transferable property” that can be valued, Jones’ services 
resulted in a health benefit, which is impossible to quantify.150  
The conventional wisdom regards a person’s health as 
priceless.  Moreover, while Ruffet and Picasso can actually 
retrieve the product or the proceeds of their services from their 
neighbors, Jones cannot go back and demand the return of the 
patient’s restored physical appearance and well-being.151   
As the above examples illustrate, the line between 
services and property gets more distorted as one distinguishes 
between tangible and intangible benefits.  Generally, a person’s 
uncompensated services may “culminate” in significant 
economic advantage to the recipient, a valuable non-economic 
benefit, or even both.  But why should a recipient of a wealth-
producing service be forced to disgorge the fair market value of 
the benefit received, while the recipient of a non-economic 
benefit should not?  Perhaps the chances of fraud are higher 
  
 148 Clark, supra note 20, at 510-11.  “The ideal can be captured by a cliché: be 
just before you are generous.”  Id. at 510.  
 149 Id.; see also John C. McCoid II, Constructively Fraudulent Conveyances: 
Transfers for Inadequate Consideration, 62 TEX. L. REV. 639, 656 (1983). 
 150 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 151 Here, we are not concerned with other means of collecting from the patient, 
i.e., recovery of fair market value of the surgery performed. 
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where a debtor has wealth-producing abilities but directs such 
abilities toward third parties instead of his creditors.  In 
bankruptcy, creditors should take priority over the residue of 
the debtor’s assets because it is only fair that they get 
something back for what they originally gave to the debtor.152  
Thus, the contractual nature of the debtor-creditor relationship 
justifies the conclusion that a recipient of services which 
“culminate in transferable property” should be forced to 
disgorge the benefit for the sake of the debtor’s creditors.         
B.  A Selective Approach: The “Underlying Chattel” Theory 
The “underlying chattel” approach supports our Ruffet 
and Picasso hypotheticals without posing any subjective 
inquiry difficulties or valuation problems in the fraudulent 
transfer context.  Surely, so long as services “culminate in 
transferable property,” such property can be fairly valued and 
the transfer can be avoided under fraudulent transfer law.153  
Without question, most creditors would welcome the 
“underlying chattel” theory in the fraudulent transfer context, 
especially because an insolvent debtor is often uninterested in 
maximizing assets for his creditors’ benefit.  In fact, “after a 
debtor has borrowed money, his interests conflict with those of 
his creditors.”154  Therefore, the “underlying chattel” approach 
may provide creditors with assurance that they would get what 
they bargained for with the debtor.   
At the same time, courts should not include services 
that do not “culminate in transferable property” under a 
“broad” definition of property.155  For one, from a debtor’s 
perspective, equating services with property may have drastic 
implications.  Current fraudulent transfer law is designed to be 
pro-creditor.156  Thus, in a case of an innocent debtor, 
fraudulent transfer law opens itself up to the possibility of 
  
 152 Garrard Glenn, The Diversities of the Preferential Transfer: A Study in 
Bankruptcy History, 15 CORNELL L.Q. 521, 525 (“The whole presupposition of the rules 
against fraudulent conveyances is that from the time a debtor knows that he is 
insolvent he holds all his property subject to the interests of his creditors.” (quoting In 
re Salmon, 239 Fed. 413, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1916) (Hand, J.))).  
 153 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 154 Baird & Jackson, supra note 20, at 833. 
 155 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 156 Jackson, supra note 41, at 783.  “[T]he [existing fraudulent] conveyance 
statutes generally focus on conveyances by the debtor, not on unilateral actions taken 
by creditors (such as foreclosure sales).”  Id. at 783 n.184. 
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abuse by creditors.157  Even though the main purpose of 
fraudulent transfer law is to prevent a debtor from defrauding 
his or her creditors, it is possible for creditors to enrich 
themselves through the machinery of fraudulent transfer 
law.158  Sewer service159 is just one of many examples of 
creditors’ unethical behavior.  Thus, if courts were to start 
equating services with property in fraudulent transfer cases, 
an already vulnerable debtor would be placed at a 
disadvantage.  Specifically, a debtor’s ability to find or 
maintain a job may be impaired as a result.  For example, an 
employer, upon checking a potential employee’s credit and 
finding that it is less than perfect, may be hesitant to extend 
an employment offer to the debtor.  Indeed, the employer may 
be wary of potential liability for additional payments to 
employee’s creditors for the services provided, if the debtor files 
for bankruptcy.  Moreover, an employee debtor may have less 
negotiating power with respect to his job.  For example, if the 
debtor prefers to take a smaller pay in exchange for other 
benefits like a reduced hour schedule or a chance to work from 
home, the debtor’s inability to do so may lead to issues of 
indentured servitude for the sake of creditors.160  The employer 
may refuse to honor the employee’s request simply because a 
bankruptcy trustee may later come after the employer for the 
full payment of the employee’s services.  Alternatively, it may 
discourage debtors from being productive in society upon 
realization that performance of uncompensated services may 
actually cost money to their service recipients. 
Another reason for services not to be classified as 
property is that, if services are considered property, creditors 
may get more than they are entitled to at the expense of third 
party recipients.  The basic principle behind fraudulent 
conveyance law is that creditors are prejudiced only by a 
transfer of an interest in property that actually belonged to the 
debtor and which would have been available to creditors 
  
 157 Id. at 783-84. 
 158 Id. at 780. 
 159 Sewer service is defined as “[t]he fraudulent service of process on a debtor 
by a creditor seeking to obtain a default judgment.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra 
note 7, at 1372. 
 160 GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES, supra note 10, § 212.  “We have seen 
that the debtor’s labour is not an asset for his creditors, since otherwise our law would 
sanction slavery.”  Id. 
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outside of bankruptcy.161  If the debtor chose to provide 
uncompensated services that is the debtor’s choice, and the 
extra money that the debtor chose not to receive should not be 
available for creditors since the debtor would have never had 
that money to begin with.  Surely, performance of services by 
the debtor is generally not a transfer of the debtor’s interest in 
property because the resulting benefit to the third party 
typically would not become an estate asset and thus would not 
be available for distribution to creditors.162  Furthermore, 
creditors are often sophisticated parties who can protect 
themselves by either not lending or in the alternative, charging 
an even higher interest rate.  Thus, fraudulent transfer law 
should not give creditors an additional advantage, especially 
when the debtor is already in a vulnerable situation.   
Aside from a debtor perspective, there are significant 
third party issues here as well.  For example, a third party 
recipient may not even know that the debtor is about to file 
bankruptcy; yet, by simply accepting the service, the third 
party recipient subjects itself to the bankruptcy court’s 
discretion.  How much emphasis should a court place on the 
actual prejudicial effect of the transaction on a third party-
transferee?  Perhaps one can accept that Ruffet’s and Picasso’s 
neighbors would have to disgorge the benefit received, 
especially since they have paid very little for it.  In that 
respect, Ruffet’s and Picasso’s creditors may be able to use a 
constructive trust remedy to cure the unjust enrichment.163  
Indeed, whenever one, innocently or not, obtains title to 
property that results in unjust enrichment, courts may declare 
that such a title-holder is the trustee of a trust, whose sole duty 
is to transfer the title and possession to the beneficiary.164  
Here, Ruffet’s and Picasso’s neighbors did not pay for the 
property which they acquired through these services.  In this 
  
 161 See ALCES, supra note 18, ¶ 6.02[1][b], at 6-4 to -5.  “Equitable distribution 
of a debtor’s estate is compromised by transactions that divest the debtor of property 
that would otherwise be available to satisfy the claims of the debtor’s general 
creditors.”  Id.  
 162 GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES, supra note 10, § 212. 
 163 “Constructive trusts are created by courts of equity whenever title to 
property is found in one who in fairness should not to be allowed to retain it.”  GEORGE 
T. BOGERT, TRUSTS, § 77, at 286 (6th ed. 1987).  Constructive trust is not an express 
trust but a judicial fiction created to rectify fraud.  Id. § 77, at 287.  In that respect, “[i]t 
is not a trust in which the trustee . . . ha[s] duties of administration . . . , but rather 
[the trust is] a passive, temporary trust, in which the trustee’s sole duty is to transfer 
the title and possession [of property] to the beneficiary.”  Id. 
 164 Id. § 77, at 286. 
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instance, courts can force them to disgorge the benefits in favor 
of the debtors’ creditors.  Under the constructive trust remedy, 
courts would consider third party recipients to be trustees and 
order them to transfer title and possession to the beneficiaries, 
i.e., the debtors’ creditors.165  The reason the constructive trust 
remedy is available to creditors here is because Ruffet’s and 
Picasso’s services created tangible property.  Generally, “[a] 
constructive trust must have definite subject matter, just as an 
express trust must meet this requirement.”166   
However, creditors cannot use the constructive trust 
remedy with respect to Jones’ patient.  Recall that Jones 
conferred a health benefit on his patient as opposed to 
property.  Without question, it is difficult to accept that Jones’ 
patient, who now may have a chance to lead a normal life, 
should be liable to Jones’ creditors.  Not only is it illogical to 
conclude that Jones unjustly enriched his patient, but it is also 
impractical to demand disgorgement of this benefit.  If an 
innocent third party can be made to pay to the debtor’s 
creditors for such an unquantifiable benefit, it is then the third 
party, not the debtor, who would feel the wrench of 
bankruptcy.167  Surely, Jones’ patient did not bargain for such 
an outcome.  
Separately, while the debtor-creditor relationship is 
typically based on contract, the contractual nature is not 
present between creditors and third party recipients.168  Due to 
this lack of privity, the bankruptcy courts should not look to 
the third party in order to make the debtor’s creditors whole.  
Indeed, the law governing the debtor-creditor relationship did 
not intend for a creditor to subject a third party to a fraudulent 
  
 165 Id.  
 166 Id. at 288. 
 167 McCoid, supra note 149, at 657-58.  “[T]ransferees, not debtors, bear the 
brunt of invalidation of fraudulent conveyances.”  Id. at 658. 
 168 GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES, supra note 10, § 140.  In his 
discussion of creditor rights with respect to debtor’s services, Glenn points out: 
True, the person for whom the debtor gratuitously laboured has been 
enriched, as may be seen in the enhanced value of the property upon which 
the efforts were expended.  But the legislation in which we are interested was 
never intended to bring creditor and third party into a quasi-contractual 
relation generally.  The inquiry is, what asset, if any, has the debtor 
transferred to the third party?  In the case of gratuitous labor, the answer 
must be that no asset has passed; hence the creditor cannot subject the third 
party to any claim under the statutes. 
Id.  
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transfer claim.169  From a practical standpoint, analyzing third 
party transactions would probably require courts to return to 
subjective intent considerations.  For example, courts may have 
to analyze whether the third party was “innocent” or whether 
he or she knew exactly what was going on when he or she 
accepted the services from the debtor.  However, under the 
selective approach, the inquiries into the third party’s psyche 
are unnecessary.  Regardless of whether the third party knew 
of the debtor’s motivations to file for bankruptcy, it would have 
to disgorge the value of the services received if the services 
“culminated into transferable property.”170  Under this 
approach, because tangible benefits have clearly assignable 
values, creditors can easily recover assets under the 
constructive trust remedy, without any practical difficulties.   
Considering that the historical progression of 
fraudulent transfer law has been toward development of 
objective criteria,171 courts should be disinclined to classify all 
services as property for the sake of judicial efficiency.  In that 
respect, the selective approach to the joinder of services and 
property limits the potential abuse and misapplication of 
fraudulent transfer law, while providing creditors with a 
workable remedy. 
CONCLUSION 
The concept of fraud is difficult to pigeonhole into one 
set of rules.  On the one hand, leaving the term property to its 
traditional meaning undermines the Code’s underlying policy 
of enhancing creditors’ recovery.  On the other hand, classifying 
all services as property expands a creditor’s advantage at the 
debtor’s and third party’s expense.  As this Note demonstrates, 
however, a selective approach to this inquiry could still fulfill 
bankruptcy goals without sacrificing judicial efficiency and 
equitable treatment of the parties involved.     
Through the selective approach, bankruptcy courts can 
achieve the mission of protecting the debtor’s assets for 
creditors without reducing fraudulent transfer law to a profit-
generating tool.  Indeed, if a debtor possesses skills that can 
  
 169 Baird & Jackson, supra note 20, at 835-36. 
 170 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 171 ALCES, supra note 18, ¶ 5.02 (stating that “[c]ourts have trouble reaching 
reliable conclusions regarding subjective matters; therefore there was a need to 
objectify fraudulent disposition law”). 
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produce an economic benefit, he should direct his efforts to 
using those skills to pay off his creditors, as opposed to 
rendering potential economic benefit on third parties.  Such 
debt collection is fair in light of the fact that the debtor did not 
live up to his debtor-creditor bargain.  But at the same time, 
courts should not allow creditors to reap profits from all third 
party recipients.  Hence, if a debtor applies his skill to confer a 
non-economic benefit, creditors should not use such a third 
party recipient as an outlet to fulfill the debtor’s bankruptcy 
obligations.  After all, fraudulent transfer laws are 
implemented to promote not just honesty in the debtor’s 
dealings with creditors but also to promote honesty among 
creditors. 
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